



Transforming Stabilization & Reconstruction Operations

Hans Binnendijk

Brief to the Netherlands Advanced
Defense Course

April 25, 2005



Outline




- The Stabilization and Reconstruction Gap
- Lessons from History, Future Scenarios
- New Military Organizations Required in US
- New Concepts, Culture, Technologies
- Changes Underway in the Pentagon
- The US Interagency Component
- Harnessing the International Community



The Stabilization and Reconstruction Gap – Figure 1



Traditional Model






The Stabilization and Reconstruction Gap – Figure 2



New Challenges (Preemption & RDOs)






Stabilization and Reconstruction Gap



Transformed S&R Capability (Bridge to Nation Building)





Lessons From History



- Successive U.S. interventions increasingly more ambitious
- Regime change/S&R missions can be successful in different cultures
- Rapid and decisive military victory does not guarantee a peaceful post-conflict stabilization environment
- A secure environment is a necessary but not sufficient for success
- “Uncontrollable factors” include political, social and economic conditions
- “Controllable factors” include level and duration of effort
- Five to seven years is historic duration of successful S&R operations
- Multilateral involvement contributes to legitimacy and burden sharing, but does not guarantee success




Army Forces in Iraq (1 May 03)



Approximate U.S. Army S&R Force Types In-Theater at the End of Major Combat Operations (1 May 2003)

TOTAL: 37,350



Reserve Component as % of Total Force

Military Police	59%
Civil Affairs	98%
Engineers	46%
Medical	35%
PSYOP	98%

- Capabilities were in theater on 1 May, but not organized for new S&R mission
- AC/RC rebalancing required



Availability of Forces (Regional and Linguistics Skills)



Army FAO resources by regional specialty are:

Latin America – 189

Europe – 195

South Asia – 35

Eurasia – 184

China – 41

North Africa/Middle East – 140

Northeast Asia – 71

Southeast Asia – 64

Sub-Saharan Africa - 83


Marine Corps. Program is smaller, newer version of Army's program; but designates both FAOs and non-language trained Regional Area Officers (RAOs).

Navy. Program based on identifying/accessing skills and initial qualification of volunteers.

Air Force. Program based on identifying/accessing skills and initial qualification of volunteers. Additional courses available for skill sustainment.




Planning Scenarios: Distribution of Size and Likely Conditions for Scenarios





An Organization for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations





Strategic Operational Concepts



- ✓ Integrated planning of combat and S&R operations
- ✓ Coherent war winning and peace-winning strategies
- ✓ Concurrency of operations
- ✓ Unity of effort
- ✓ Compelling and consistent strategic message
- ✓ Precision targeting of rejectionist elements
- ✓ Improved cultural intelligence
- ✓ Early, demonstrable success in reconstruction
- ✓ Early introduction of indigenous capabilities
- ✓ Maximize Allied support early
- ✓ Modular, scalable, ready and Joint S&R capabilities
- Use new technologies
 - ✓ Highlighted in 9 September 2004 JFC "Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept."



Adapting the Military Culture (Required skill sets for S&R)



- Warfighting skills in case conflict escalates
- Courage to take risks
- Confidence to delegate authority & need for trust
- Confidence to do things that have never been done before
- Increased decision-making skills
- Adapt or adjust to new environments
- Fairness and evenhandedness to all parties
- * Vision of politico-military environment**
- * Interact with nonmilitary partners & build consensus**
- * Negotiations**
- * Broad intellectual background (sociology, law, etc.)**
- * Interpersonal skills**
- * Understanding historical/cultural contexts**



Technologies for S&R Operations



- Security
 - Civilian-military communications interoperability
 - Network counter-terrorist analysis tools
 - Biometrics
 - Non-lethal weapons
- Infrastructure
 - Civil infrastructure simulations
 - Infrastructure equipment (water purification, electric power)
- Human Relations
 - Mobile, real-time language translators
 - Elite leadership modeling




Army Actions that Respond to Stability Operations Requirements



- Expand number of brigades: add civil affairs, intelligence, etc. to each brigade. Modular capabilities to augment.
- Increasing the numbers of civil affairs, military police, and PSYOP units in the overall (AC and RC) force. Shift from artillery/air defense. Add 30,000 troops.
- Make Task Force Commanders responsible for post-combat missions.
- National Training Center with Arab villages to train for stability operations.
- Intensifying the focus on Stability Operations in doctrine development and when harvesting Lessons Learned from current operations.
- Investment in Stability Ops capabilities: Stryker integration, body armor, armored HUMMVs) and IED countermeasures.
- Recruiting Arabic speakers into the Ready Reserve.



Modularity: The Right Force in the Joint Fight





Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study



- S&R operations are long term and expensive, consume force structure
- Need NSC-run “Contingency Planning and Integration Task Forces” for top contingencies
- Need new Center for Strategic Communications
- Treat stabilization as an explicit mission for DoD force planning
- Army should appoint senior advocate for S&R and define S&R modules below brigade level
- Army modular initiatives not enough, need JFC to experiment with new innovative concepts: task organize, new combinations
- Current pace of S&R operations will require changes in force structure: mitigation through contract personnel, technology, partners, etc
- Combatant Commander to develop intelligence campaign plans for pre and post-conflict
- Enhance tagging, tracking and locating capability



Draft Pentagon Directive




- Stability ops accorded priority and attention comparable to combat ops; incorporated into all phases of planning
- Units organized for guerilla warfare, counter-terrorism and ‘pre- and post-conflict’ stability ops
- Training to have much greater emphasis on foreign language and regional cultural expertise
- Expanding role of intelligence gathering and analysis for “sustained coverage and deep penetration” in potential regions of instability
- Development of near term technologies to identify, track and locate potential enemies and threats
- Combatant Commanders to devote more resources to and include post-conflict operations in their war plans
- Coordination with and support other US Departments and Agencies, foreign governments and security forces, International Organizations, NGOs and Private Sector



Lugar-Biden Bill to Strengthen Civilian S&R Capabilities



- Creates new office at State for S&R operations (now in being)
- Creates new directorate at NSC and new interagency committee
- Adds 250 people for deployable Response Readiness Corps and more for a Response Readiness Reserve
- Provides a \$100 million contingency fund, special waivers, and personnel exchange authorities
- Develops new NDU/FSI/AWC education and training S&R programs for civilian personnel
- Need to work out command arrangements and modes of cooperation between military and civilian entities



NATO

Stabilization & Reconstruction Force



- Division of labor can divide Alliance, role specialization necessary
- Some Allies (Germany, Italy) favor specialized forces, others (UK, France) favor multitasking
- Taken together, Allies have considerable experience and manpower for S&R operations
- But, *ready and deployable* European capabilities are stretched thin
- Organizing for Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan was ad hoc
- NATO needs to identify S&R assets and consider ways to better plan, organize and exercise for these missions
- Partners should be involved
- NATO should initiate a six month study on NATO S&R Force options

- Create Strategic Concept
- Revitalize US-European Dialogue
- Streamline Decision-making in NATO

