

# Political Pressures Aggravate Japanese'

By HANS BINNENDIJK  
News Correspondent

OSAKA, Japan — Three major issues dominated US-Japanese relations during the past year.

The first was the reversion of Okinawa, which was settled last November in a meeting between President Nixon and Prime Minister Eisaku Sato. The second was the renewal of the Mutual Security Pact; and the third, the recent failure of the tariff negotiations.

In each case, the Japanese government has found itself uncomfortably wedged between the US and the pressure of public opinion.

In the case of Okinawa, Sato elected to side with public opinion. The prime minister himself was emotionally involved in the issue.

The Japanese press had a field day, writing article after article in order to increase the intensity of

public anger. Faced with what seemed to be a rebellious situation, the US decided in favor of returning Okinawa to Japan by 1972.

However, now that things have quieted down, many observers have stated that the situation was never that urgent. The Japanese public, they argue, was not as enraged as some would have us believe. Although most American embassy officials favored the return, it was often difficult for them to find reliable data to prove that Japanese sentiments were as intense as reported.

Instead, it seems that several hard working pressure groups were most responsible for the headlines.

Reversion of Okinawa was in the Japanese national interest, so Prime Minister Sato came to Washington last November, armed with his public opinion polls.

He asked for the return of the islands and got what he wanted. As

a reward, his Liberal Democratic party was elected in the December elections by an impressive margin.

Now it seems too late for the US to reconsider. If the Congress should renege on President Nixon's agreement with the Japanese, as they are threatening to do, the domestic scene in Japan might truly become cause for concern. In the words of a high Japanese official, Okinawa would become totally unmanageable.

The Security Treaty with the US demanded a similar choice for Sato. Three quarters of a million Japanese took to the streets last month to protest the treaty. Yet, the demonstrations were quite orderly.

While the marches were anti-American in name, they demonstrated against American preponderance of power rather than against any American individuals. US exchange students

sat unmenaced as the throngs of marchers passed by.

In the Security Treaty issue, public opinion was ignored, though it was this issue that caused the demise of former Prime Minister Kishi, Sato's younger brother.

Two changes are occurring with regard to the Security Treaty. The Japanese now seem to be willing to defend both South Korea and Formosa. Although it has been in their national interest to do this all along, they stated it only as recently as last November. The move was planned to pacify the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had opposed return of Okinawa.

The second change involves removal of US Armed Forces from Japan. A quasi-official committee under the direction of Tadao, a military affairs expert, is now investigating the matter.

It was this committee that convinced Prime Minister Sato that

reversion was  
mittee, accord  
is now thinkin  
ten years.

After that  
Treaty will o  
Japanese-US  
tion", said a  
This withdraw  
quel to troop  
Vietnam and

The textile  
weeks ago ar  
a choice that  
ment had to r  
position on r  
tain domestic  
the other.

The Japan  
are the mave  
business com  
borrow large  
the governm  
large number

The textile  
able to wield  
convincing S

# Japanese' Problems

reversion was possible. The committee, according to one member, is now thinking in terms of five to ten years.

After that time, "the Security Treaty will only be a symbol of Japanese-US military cooperation", said a committee member. This withdrawal is the natural sequel to troop withdrawals from Vietnam and South Korea.

The textile talks that folded two weeks ago are another example of a choice that the Japanese Government had to make between the US position on the one hand and certain domestic pressure groups on the other.

The Japanese textile industries are the mavericks of the Japanese business community. They do not borrow large sums of money from the government and they employ large number of workers.

The textile lobby, therefore, was able to wield significant pressure convincing Sato's government to

stand firm in the textile negotiations.

Foreign Minister Kiichi Aichi and Finance Minister Takeo Fukuda were sent as the Japanese negotiators with great confidence that their demands for an additional year of voluntary controls, with multilateral talks at the end of the period, would be met.

The US refused these terms and no agreement was reached. The repercussions on the \$8,300 million worth of trade between the two countries depends upon Congressional reactions.

Secretary of State Roger's recent visit to Japan has somewhat reassured Sato's government of US intentions. However, many observers see the diverging economic interests of the two powers and express their dismay.

The outcome seems to depend on Sato's agility in striking a precarious balance between US interests and political pressures at home.