Strategic Assessment 1997

Flashpoints and Force Structure

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November 1996

Structure of the Brief

- Summary
- Emerging Strategic Environment
- Military Missions
- Force Structure

Assumptions

■ Three major revolutions: geostrategic; information; government.

■ Complexity makes point predictions more questionable
   • Shift towards range of problems--range of capabilities

■ Analyze: Major Powers; Regional Conflict; Troubled States; Transnational Problems.

■ Focus on next 10 years

Summary of Strategic Assessment 1997

- **Chance of 2 near simultaneous MRCs Low**

- **But Security Issues Broadening**
  - Theater <u>Peer</u> Competitors
  - Potentially higher OOTW, Optempo demands

- **Diverse Missions**

- **Different Force Paths**
  - A Recapitalization Path
  - An Accelerated RMA Path
  - A Full Spectrum Path

Strategic Environment: Major Powers

- Major Power Cooperation may be ending
- Russia/China will not become global peer, but could challenge U.S. interests on their peripheries
- Large scale land warfare unlikely
- U.S. policy towards Russia and China:
  - PERSUADE to engage constructively
  - DISSUADE from arms race
- U.S. force planners must hedge against prospect of peripheral warfare with potential theater peer
- U.S. as major power stabilizer

Strategic Environment: Significant Regional Contingencies

- Two MRCs less useful as primary planning scenario in 1997 than in 1993

- Korean Peninsula: North weakening, could collapse

- Iraq, Iran weakening but retain aggressive ambitions

- To hedge, use strategic measures to deter simultaneous conflict

- U.S. will operate at risk to bio/chem/nuclear attack

Strategic Environment: Troubled States

- Conflicts highly likely
- Few situations pose direct, immediate threat to vital U.S. interests
- But international community and U.S. public, at times, demand intervention

Strategic Environment: Transnational Problems

- Terrorism becoming more diffuse, less openly state sponsored, more targeted at U.S.
  - Protecting U.S. forces against terrorist acts increasing problem
- International crime can weaken states
- Sudden wave of migrants likely
- International environmental problems growing

Strategic Environment (Summary)

- Strategic Lull: No global peer
- Broad range of problems
  - Theater peer (rising)
  - Major regional contingencies (declining)
  - Troubled states (maintained)
  - Transnational problems (rising)
- Shift from middle of spectrum (MRC) to the high (theater peer) and the lower end (operations other than war)

Military Missions Vis-a-Vis Major Powers

- Maintain a strong alliance structure
- Maintain Forward Presence to stabilize
- Deter nuclear attack
- Conduct limited operations on edges of a major power
  - Requires caution and means to limit escalation
  - Not like crisis with large regional state
    - Have ICBMs, so must avoid uncontrolled escalation
    - Too large to defeat totally, need to thwart
  - Maintain superiority in Information Warfare capabilities

Military Missions for Regional Conflict

- Defend territory
  - Prepare to operate in a coalition
  - Maximize power projection
- Liberate territory
  - Major task for heavy ground maneuver units
- Operate in a theater at risk to WMD strikes
- Enforce sanctions and embargoes
- Exploit "Defense Engagement"

Military Missions Vis-a-Vis Troubled States

- Maintain on-call capability for peace operations
- Deploy adequate support forces to sustain a peace operation
- Augment the law enforcement capability of the host state
- Conduct NEOs, disaster relief

Military Missions Vis-a-Vis Transnational Problems

- Assist U.S. civilian authorities in countering terrorism, drug traffic
- Control refugee flow

Military Missions (Summary)

- **Challenge is to plan for broader range of missions**
- **Response is to establish priorities, have agility**
- **Potential theater peer: top future priority**
  - Limited operations on that power's rim
  - Large operations on their territory unlikely
- **Regional contingencies: second priority**
  - Defend, liberate territory
  - Operate at risk to WMD
- **Troubled states, transnational problems**
  - Need to fix optempo problem
  - Response depends upon resource availability

Force Structure Options

- 3 "models" considered for circa 2007
  - Recapitalized Force
  - Accelerated RMA
  - Full Spectrum
- Differ in terms of how they balance continuity and change
- Will link each force structure model to the missions discussed above

The Recapitalization Force

- Adjusts procurement upward--Pays with force structure reductions and tiered readiness

- Maintains current modernization and technical improvement trends
  - Fewer heavy ground and TacAir assets
  - Designates active force units for OOTW
- Costs decline to $230 billion per year

The Recapitalization Force

- **Pros:**
  - Minimizes disruption of change
  - Less expensive than current force
  - Frees up resources for recapitalization

- **Cons:**
  - Reduced readiness for high intensity conflict
  - May miss "strategic lull" opportunity to achieve RMA, circa 2007
  - "One Size Fits All" may not do any mission really well

The Accelerated RMA Force

- **Force that fights differently than today**
  - Concurrent vice sequential operations
  - Nodal vice attrition warfare
- **Accelerated technological and organizational change**
- **Significant manpower reductions**
  - Relies on Reserve forces for OOTW
- **Costs decline to $210 billion per year**

The Accelerated RMA Force

- **Pros:**
  - Best solution for future combat
  - Well suited to WMD/PGM/Terrorist environment
  - Less expensive

- **Cons:**
  - Bets a lot on systems integration
  - High risk/turmoil in short- to mid-term
  - Radically different approach to forward presence
  - Requires reserves for most OOTW

The Full Spectrum Force

- **Designed to meet high-end/low-end threats**
  - Accelerated technological change
  - Designates active forces for OOTW
- **Minor reductions in force structure**
- **Costs stay at $250 billion per year**

The Full Spectrum Force

- Pros:
  - Broad range capability in short range; advanced capabilities in longer range
  - Best able to meet OOTW and optempo Demands without procedural changes
- Cons:
  - Costs more than now programmed, plus raises recapitalization concerns
  - Modernizes slower than RMA