

# The Emerging European Security Order

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THE TECTONICS of the old European security order have been in metamorphosis for two years, creating political earthquakes and new fault lines on the Eurasian landmass. The security institutions straddling these fissures have had to undergo fundamental changes. They are either dying (the Warsaw Pact), evolving (the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe), undergoing revitalization (Western European Union), restructuring to adjust (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), or searching for new missions (European Community).

The dramatically changing political landscape makes this the sixth period of fundamental transition in European security affairs in the past two centuries. The first came with the rise of Napoleon after the French Revolution. A security alliance was eventually formed specifically to crush him. The second period began in 1815 when the Concert of Europe was born in Vienna. This flexible system of shifting alliances succeeded in maintaining the balance of power in Europe until the rise of the German empire in 1871. Bismarck's successors ushered in a third system of more rigid alliances that could not deal with regional instability and locked Europe into the tragedy of World War I. The fourth sys-

tem, established at Versailles in 1919, relied at least initially on loose alliances and the rule of law implemented by a fatally flawed League of Nations. The fifth system, formed at the end of World War II, returned to rigid alliances and gave us the Cold War.

The sixth system, the new European order, is likely to have elements drawn from these previous cycles of history. As in other cases, it took a defeat—albeit not a military defeat or even one imposed from the outside—of one of the major parties to change the system. Like most preceding systems, the basic parameters of the new order will be determined within a few years of that defeat. It will have an alliance system less rigid than that of the Cold War, continuing the historical pattern of alternating fixed and more flexible systems. And, if history is any guide, the new system could last for more than a generation. The past average has been nearly four decades.

The detailed outlines of this more uncertain, more complex, and possibly less stable new order may be visible by the end of 1991. The changing nature of the risks of conflict is becoming clear. The Soviet domestic crisis creates the potential for substantial disorder. The first case of major ethnic conflict in post-cold war Eastern Europe is unfolding in Yugoslavia. Defense integration among West European nations is taking uncertain turns. And the transatlantic relationship, al-

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though still firm, is in a holding pattern absorbing lessons from the Gulf War and waiting for Europe to define its own defense identity.

The opportunities are many and massive. With the right mix of political will and luck, the multilayered set of interlocking security institutions that is emerging may provide the flexible system that is needed to deal with the various problems that threaten the peace in Europe.<sup>1</sup>

This article will first review the changing threats to peace in Europe that exist after allied victories in the Cold War and the Gulf War. Next it will assess the changes that are under way in the key Western security institutions. And finally, it will offer some rules of the road to guide decision makers during the closing months of 1991.

### The New Security Environment

During the Cold War, the conventionally superior Warsaw Pact forces posed the only overwhelming security threat to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Today that threat is gone and unlikely to return in the same form. NATO now conceives of "risks" rather than "threats," but perhaps these situations are best described as instabilities because most stem from internal disorder rather than calculated decisions to commit aggression. Risks to Europe's peace might come from a revanchist or disintegrating Soviet Union, from ethnic conflict or transition problems in central and southeastern Europe, or from escalating third world conflict involving nations armed with ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. In short, Western Europe has exchanged the iron curtain for a "belt of instability" stretching from Riga in the East,

through Romania to the Southeast, and ending at Rabat to the Southwest.

*The Changing Soviet Dimension.* President Mikhail Gorbachev has followed a zigzag course to try to preserve the Soviet Union intact and to achieve perestroika. In autumn 1990, he believed both goals were threatened by reformers seeking both independence for the republics and overly ambitious economic changes. Moving to the right, he found both the Union threatened by violent repression and no support for perestroika. At the same time Boris Yeltsin continued to gain political legitimacy while national productivity tumbled, convincing Gorbachev that the future lay with greater democracy and economic reform. Gorbachev's recent alliance with Yeltsin may be his last chance to attain his twin goals on his own terms. By devolving large measures of state authority to the republics and making secession legal but economically quite painful, he hopes to preserve the Union. By developing far-reaching economic reforms that retain an element of central control, he hopes to attract foreign aid without completely alienating the conservatives. Should his alliance with Yeltsin again falter, or should it fail to yield economic results, Gorbachev has little room left for maneuver. Polarization and possible civil war could follow.

One outcome of Soviet internal collapse could be rule by the right. It is in this case that the West might again have to worry about a risk of conflict with a revanchist Soviet Union. With Soviet forces remaining in Germany and Poland for up to three more years, there is plenty of potential for problems. But a short-warning conventional military threat exists only on NATO's flanks, where the excuses for aggression are limited. To prepare for



the enforcement deadlines set up by the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement of November 1990, Moscow has moved some 57,000 pieces of major defense equipment east of the Urals.<sup>2</sup> A quarter of that total will be destroyed or converted, while the Soviets have given assurances that the rest will be stored in a way that prevents rapid deployment westward. Redeployment of the remainder westward would provide months of warning time and would violate the CFE agreement. About 7,500 additional Soviet tanks and 9,000 armored combat vehicles will also be incapacitated once CFE has been ratified. The East European armed forces that were counted against Warsaw Pact totals in reaching conventional parity could now be expected to fight against Soviet troops that violate their territory. In all, the number of potentially hostile troops in Eastern Europe alone will decline by about one million.

In November 1990, the Soviet general staff calculated that the correlation of forces in Europe had turned against Moscow by a ratio of 1.6 to 1.<sup>3</sup> That was before they had seen the U.S. military perform in the Gulf War against predominantly Soviet equipment and Soviet-trained troops. The Western victory shocked the Soviet military, forcing Marshal Dmitri Yazov to call publicly for a review of Soviet air defense capabilities. The result may be abandonment of "defensive sufficiency," because the U.S. offensive demolished a Soviet-designed defense. Return to a more offensive doctrine would be coupled with greater reliance on high-tech weapons and a more professional army. Such a force would warrant continued NATO attention.

None of these developments affects the Soviet nuclear threat. The Stra-

tegic Arms Reduction Talks (START) will leave Moscow with both a significant hard-target kill capability and a relatively invulnerable intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force. That may not be true of the U.S. ICBM force after START. In addition, the pending short-range nuclear force talks (SNF) are on hold, with Washington increasingly unwilling to negotiate reductions bilaterally that it plans to make unilaterally anyway. Moscow may take a tougher line on future nuclear reductions because the Soviets may need their own flexible response doctrine to offset conventional force asymmetries. Now may be the time for Washington to develop a more aggressive program for nuclear arms reductions that will more clearly define the nature of minimum deterrence, both in European and strategic nuclear systems.<sup>4</sup>

Conventional or nuclear threats to the West appear much less realistic than risks associated with Soviet domestic upheaval. Economic turmoil coupled with relatively free emigration conjures up visions of a horde of Soviet refugees marching westward. In addition, if the Soviet Union should collapse, new ethnic and border clashes might break out throughout the area. The potential for civil war raises the added concern that Soviet nuclear weapons might become bargaining chips in the conflict. Most nuclear weapons have been removed from trouble spots, but with tens of thousands of warheads, not all could be guaranteed in safe hands. A senior Soviet general recently knocked on wood three times after explaining Soviet nuclear command and control procedures to his stunned Western audience.

These dramatic scenarios of Soviet civil war, chaos, and a return to hard-line rule need to be considered by Western security analysts. The most



likely outcome, however, is that Soviet leaders will try to put off conflict and simply muddle through.

*Eastern Europe in Strategic Limbo.* The demise of the Warsaw Pact was widely applauded throughout central and southeastern Europe, but there is little to take its place. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was initially regarded as a possible substitute, but its limitations have now been recognized. The nations of central Europe had also hoped for NATO membership but they are beginning to understand that this would push the Soviet Union too far and that membership is closed to them at least for now. NATO's June 6, 1991, Copenhagen declaration that "coercion and intimidation" aimed at the countries of central and southeastern Europe would be treated as a matter of "direct and material concern" is probably as much of a commitment as these countries will receive from the West.<sup>5</sup> Associate status in the European Community (EC) might provide some vague security commitments, but full membership probably remains years away. Regional security has failed before in Eastern Europe, although some regional security cooperation in areas like air defense will prove useful. None wants Swedish-style neutrality.

These countries are, thus, in a strategic limbo with no obvious defense arrangements, and they may have to rely on a series of "negative-security" pacts until NATO or EC membership eventually opens to some or until the CSCE matures. These pacts would bind each country not to take certain steps that might threaten the security of the other country. Romania has already signed such an agreement with the Soviet Union, in which Romania pledges not to join another alliance.

The countries of central Europe will resist making similar pledges, but they may agree that no foreign troops should be stationed on their soil. The Soviets would reciprocate by agreeing not to station forces in these central European countries in the future.<sup>6</sup> If the West is asked to guarantee such a no-troops pledge, however, it may in fact be providing some degree of military commitment to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. Meanwhile, these countries will pursue economic, political, and cultural ties with the West and hope that this reinforces the deterrent effect of the "shadow of NATO."

Unfortunately, the region in strategic limbo is also the most unstable part of Europe.<sup>7</sup> Its problems range from civil war between Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia to the possibility of conflict between Hungary and Romania. Most states remain politically and economically fragile during their transition from communism. Democracy and peaceful transfer of power are not yet the norm. If violence erupts, the West could feel compelled to become involved either to stop slaughter or to prevent neighboring states from intervening in favor of ethnic minorities. Close U.S.-Soviet consultations are required to avoid the dangerous misunderstandings that are inherent in the current situation of vague commitments. The West's ability to aid central and southeastern Europe and to manage conflict there could be the single most important security task it faces this decade.

*The New Risk from the South.* The Gulf War has dramatized for most Europeans that risks to their security will increasingly come from the South. The sight of ballistic missiles landing in Tel Aviv, the threat of chemical warfare, the risks of nuclear proliferation, and



the sophistication of advanced weapons available to developing countries seriously concern European decision makers. So do terrorism and the constant flow of immigrants from the Maghreb.

The Gulf War demonstrated that Europe alone, as it is now organized, is incapable of dealing with many of the new threats. Although it was able to help enforce the economic embargo on Iraq through naval activities coordinated by the Western European Union (WEU), it was unable to reach internal agreement on what to do next. The French broke ranks with a last-minute unilateral peace initiative. The Belgians were unwilling to sell artillery ammunition to the British. The Germans hesitated before honoring the NATO commitment and sending Alpha jets to a threatened Turkey. And European reliance on U.S. airlift, sea-lift, command and control, intelligence, and manpower was painfully clear for the world to see. Europe's military and political gaps will not be filled easily. So although Europe emerged from the war impressed by U.S. resolve and military capability and perhaps even more reliant on them, it also emerged with a strong desire to find a more united and equal voice in foreign and security policy.

The Gulf War has also had the effect of creating two separate categories of what in the NATO context used to be called "out-of-area issues." The first is problems on NATO's periphery. Inspired by the Iraqi threat to Turkey, this category includes potential conflicts involving neighboring countries that could directly threaten NATO countries. In these cases, NATO might take a more direct role. The second category includes the more traditional out-of-area problems where vital interests of NATO members are at stake. NATO officials hope

to deal with these cases primarily through joint intelligence and policy coordination but not necessarily through direct NATO military action.<sup>8</sup>

### NATO Tries to Adjust

In the days of the Cold War, NATO's mission was often described by using Lord Ismay's famous dictum that its purpose was to keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down. Perhaps the new purpose of European security is to pull the East up, bring Europe together, and continue to keep the Americans in. A more detailed list of goals would include the following:

- deter any residual Soviet threat;
- provide some collaborative structure for Western security ties with the Soviet Union;
- encourage democratization in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe;
- extend a degree of stability to Eastern Europe through assistance, conflict resolution, and if necessary peacekeeping;
- keep Germany as an integral part of the Alliance and the European Community;
- avoid renationalization of European armies;
- maintain strong U.S. ties with and influence on European defense efforts; and
- organize Western responses to crises, aggression, and arms proliferation outside the NATO area.

The institutional instruments needed to accomplish these tasks are more complex than the NATO of the Cold War. No single organization can do the job, and a multilayered set of interlocking institutions is needed. Europe's security priority must be to adjust existing institutions to accom-



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plish these goals and to create new institutions if necessary.

NATO's role in this effort will be, first, to hedge against a renewed Soviet threat; second, to keep German and other armies as part of an integrated European command; and, third, to maintain a U.S. commitment to Europe. But staying in nearly the same place during a period of rapid transition has required significant movement. NATO can accomplish the same goals with less military capability but perhaps at the cost of spending more political capital to hold the Alliance together. The broad outlines for NATO's transformation were developed in the London Declaration of July 6, 1990, which declared that:

- the Warsaw Pact would no longer be considered an adversary;
- conventional forces would be smaller, highly mobile, more versatile, increasingly multinational, and more reliant on reserves and force reconstitution; and
- nuclear forces would be truly weapons of last resort.<sup>9</sup>

Since then, a three-tier review has been under way to implement the London Declaration. The reviews are to be completed prior to the November 1991 NATO summit, which is expected to put the new NATO policies in final form. At the most senior level, the NATO Council has struggled with fundamental political issues such as redefining NATO's basic functions. It has made little progress on key issues such as extending NATO commitments eastward, using NATO troops for peacekeeping in Eastern Europe, and extending NATO operations out of its area to deal with North-South and proliferation issues. The French have resisted any expansion of NATO's functions, so Europe will prob-

ably have to rely on other institutions for this purpose.

The Strategic Review Group, chaired by Britain's Michael Legge, is considering alternatives to existing NATO doctrine. Forward Defense will be discarded in favor of a doctrine that allows for mobility and some forward positioning. Flexible response will be recast to make it consistent with reduced tactical nuclear force deployments and the new "last resort" policy. But NATO continues to shy away from discussions of nuclear issues. In general, Legge's review will recommend a broader approach to security issues in which military force is not dominant and crisis management is a more important tool. Preliminary work on the review has been completed and negotiations are under way with the French.<sup>10</sup>

The most progress has been made by the Military Committee and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), although logically broad strategic parameters should be set before military details are decided. On May 28, 1991, NATO announced a revamped concept that included the following.

- A mobile immediate reaction force numbering 5,000 capable of responding to crisis in 72 hours;
- A Rapid Reaction Corps 50,000 to 70,000 strong designed to respond in less than one week. The corps would be commanded by the British and include two British divisions, two multinational divisions, and U.S. ground, air, and air transport units.
- A base force of seven multinational corps designed to defend Western Europe. Included would be three German corps (one in the eastern part of Germany), one Dutch corps, one Belgian corps, one mixed Ger-



man and Danish corps, and one U.S. corps. A U.S. division would serve in a German corps and vice versa.

- An augmentation force, made up primarily of U.S. units, designed to reinforce NATO's base force.<sup>11</sup>

Under this concept, NATO troops might be reduced by 350,000, of which nearly half could be Americans. By the mid-1990s (after Soviet troops leave Germany), the United States would have in Europe a corps headquarters, two army divisions, and corps support elements. This would yield a new U.S. force level of about half of the current 320,000 troops or less. The position of Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) would continue to be held by an American, at least for now.<sup>12</sup>

The NATO reforms will change the institution enough to enable it to survive in the new environment. All nations of Western Europe—even the French—want NATO to remain. The adjustments should also help Europe in future transatlantic burden-sharing debates. Significant progress was made at the May 1991 meeting of NATO defense ministers in consolidating NATO's position, but the debate over the European defense identity continues.

### The European Defense Identity

The founding fathers of the European Community had a vision of a United States of Europe with its own independent defense identity. Several events during the past two years have raised the prospect that their vision might be achieved before the end of this decade. Inertia following the ratification of the Single European Act and the talks on monetary union led to the formation in December 1990 of

a second Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC), which is assigned the task of drafting a Political Union Treaty by the end of 1991. The Germans want political union as the price for monetary union. Others want monetary union in order to benefit from the strength of the deutsche mark, and coincidentally they want to anchor a united Germany firmly in West European institutions. The changed threat perception with regard to the USSR allows Europe to contemplate a more united role, and the prospect of U.S. troop withdrawals may compel them to consider it. Above all, Europe's weak response to the Gulf crisis has forced it to find ways to strengthen its institutional ability to respond to future crises.

The bidding was opened by the Italian foreign minister, Gianni de Michelis, who suggested an early EC-WEU merger. The president of the EC Commission, Jacques Delors, provided a more comprehensive approach in an address in London on March 7, 1991, when he called for the insertion of the mutual defense clause of the WEU's Article 5 into the Political Union Treaty. With an EC mutual defense commitment, the WEU would eventually emerge as the key institution for European security. Delors also suggested that the WEU should be a "melting-pot for a European defense embedded in the community."<sup>13</sup> The Delors proposal is generally considered overly ambitious.

Franco-German collaboration has been a driving factor in setting the agenda for the establishment of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) within the EC. In joint statements, the two countries have called for cooperation among the 12 EC members to present common positions on security issues in the NATO coordination process. Issues to be dis-



cussed by the EC would range from multilateral arms control to armaments cooperation. They have also called for the European Council (summits of the Twelve) to provide guidelines to the EC. Ultimately, after 1996, they envision absorption of the WEU by the EC.<sup>14</sup> Until that time, the WEU would serve as what WEU Secretary General Wim van Eekelen has called a "temporary bridge" between NATO and the EC.<sup>15</sup>

The current draft of the IGC Political Union Treaty foresees a two-stage process. In the short run, it envisions an organic relationship between the WEU and the EC, the nature of which is unclear. In the longer run, it would set as a goal a common EC defense policy, with a review in 1996 to reconsider merger of the WEU and the EC. The British and Dutch have objected to much of this plan. Final decisions on these matters will be taken in the IGC in the context of trade-offs with issues on monetary union.

A key set of issues to be decided in 1991 relates to the role and orientation of the WEU. The phoenix-like WEU is a nine-member European defense organization originally designed to hedge against postwar German rearmament. Its efforts to coordinate European naval operations in the two recent Gulf crises have made it a focal point for the European defense identity. It has no military forces or command structure of its own, but proposals are being discussed to allow some European troops dedicated to NATO's new Rapid Reaction Force to be at the same time the core of a WEU-based force of the same name. Van Eekelen has suggested a series of arrangements by which ambassadors would represent their countries in both the WEU and NATO, and he has also promoted coordinated WEU-European Council meetings so that the WEU can be a

bridge between NATO and the EC as well. But transition measures do not solve the underlying problem that the United States and Britain want the WEU to become the second pillar of NATO, whereas France and to a lesser extent Germany want it under the direct control of the European Council. The bridge is under pressure from both directions. France moved aggressively to push its view when it set a precedent by calling a WEU meeting in the middle of the April 1991 EC summit and later reportedly proposed an EC rather than a NATO Rapid Reaction Force.

The United States has viewed many of these developments with alarm. Despite years of support for a European pillar within NATO, the United States is concerned that movement toward a European defense identity will bring about U.S. political and military isolation within NATO and that eventually a new European defense organization will compete with NATO. If developments go the wrong way, they could force U.S. troops out of NATO and perhaps even destroy the Alliance. William Taft, U.S. ambassador to NATO, speaking in London on February 9, 1991, warned that Americans would be suspicious of those who "mess" too much with familiar security structures.<sup>16</sup> A harsh U.S. diplomatic note to European capitals followed on February 22, warning against a European caucus in NATO that might move decision making on defense issues from NATO to the EC. The United States does not mind if the WEU presents a coordinated position in NATO councils, but it fears that the EC has a history of reaching agreed positions that leave little negotiating flexibility, a development the United States would find intolerable in the defense area. Washington does not want to repeat within NATO



France resists moving closer to NATO's integrated command structure. France also supports efforts such as the European Confederation (CSECE minus North America), a stand that is likely to alienate the United States. Second, France emerged from the Gulf War impressed with Europe's weak response and convinced of the need to maintain its independence of action. Yet France champions deep political unity within the EC that would deny it a good deal of freedom of action. Third, France supports a European defense policy and a European army. Yet the one institution currently established for that purpose, the WEU, is dismissed by the Elysée as too close to NATO. The French want to retain the U.S. insurance policy without making premium payments. Germany has emerged from unification and the Gulf crisis looking primarily inward and secondarily toward Eastern Europe. It must deal with over 30 percent unemployment in the five new *Länder* and instability along its eastern borders. To reassure Western Europe during unification, Chancellor Helmut Kohl linked Germany to French concepts of European integration. His personal vision includes a European army and a European currency. Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, however, wants to maintain an option to expand the European Community eastward that is incompatible with an early EC defense commitment. Kohl and Genscher also differ on whether Germany should allow its troops to perform out-of-area operations sanctioned by the WEU or NATO, and a constitutional amendment to allow such deployments is unlikely to receive the required two-thirds vote. Because of these divisions and uncertainties in German policy, the British have made special efforts to divert the Germans from the current

the experience of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) debate over the Common Agricultural Policy. Secretary of State James A. Baker III summarized the U.S. position by saying "one of our key goals must be to insure that NATO remains the principal venue for our consultations and the forum for agreement on all policies bearing on the security and defense commitments of its members."<sup>17</sup> Similarly, SACEUR General John Galvin is concerned that a parallel European command structure established either in the WEU or the EC would be expensive and confusing and would undermine the U.S. role in NATO.<sup>18</sup> The message is clear. The United States has changed its signals on a European defense identity from green to blinking amber. With this display of U.S. concern, Europe is recalculating its position. The British, under Prime Minister John Major, are pursuing their newly articulated desire to be "at the heart" of the European process. But Britain remains concerned that EC procedures would paralyze decision making on defense and drive a wedge in the transatlantic relationship. They believe that strengthening the WEU provides a viable alternative. Given Major's success in providing EC leadership on the Kurdish problem, Britain is now strongly placed to influence the evolution of a European position. The French position is more complex and somewhat contradictory. First, the French give great importance to NATO and the U.S. commitment to Europe. Since the Gulf War, President François Mitterrand has developed close personal ties with President George Bush and now consistently praises NATO and the United States in his foreign policy speeches. Despite NATO reforms, however,



pattern of Franco-German cooperation. They appear to have been partially successful, because Kohl stressed in Washington during his visit of May 1991 that Germany did not want NATO diminished or replaced by a new European security system and that the WEU should be NATO's European pillar.<sup>19</sup>

Other Europeans are also uneasy with current plans for defense integration within the EC. In addition to wanting to avoid transatlantic tensions, the Dutch are concerned that the larger countries will dominate the European Council. The neutral Irish do not want to undertake an EC defense commitment. The Danes and Greeks are in the EC but not the WEU. The Turks feel isolated now and would object to being excluded from a new, stronger European defense community. The Portuguese value good transatlantic relations above all. Even the Italians are having second thoughts and are backing away from an early EC-WEU merger. NATO Secretary General Manfred Wörner has contributed to the debate by announcing seven principles to guide development of Europe's defense identity.<sup>20</sup> So Europe proceeds into the IGC Political Union talks with determined caution.

As Europe's caution waxes, it is possible that U.S. concerns will wane. Guidance to the WEU by the European Council might not differ significantly from what happens now because the WEU would be taking orders from nearly the same group of leaders. A single European voice in NATO would not be a disaster, as long as rigid positions were avoided. And a WEU structure that could command elements of the NATO Rapid Reaction Force might prove useful in cases where U.S. involvement would be detrimental. Convergence of transat-

lantic views on the nature of the European defense identity and its relationship to NATO is entirely possible.<sup>21</sup>

### Additional Security Arrangements

In addition to NATO and the WEU, several other security institutions will contribute to the new European order.

Of these, the CSCE's function is perhaps most complex. Its unanimity rule and the Soviet veto make it useless as a true collective security organization to replace NATO. But it could be very useful to provide a collaborative structure for Soviet-Western relations; promote conflict prevention and perhaps peacekeeping in Eastern Europe; and encourage democratization in the East. During the November 1990 CSCE summit in Paris, the organization received a secretariat (in Prague), a conflict prevention center (in Vienna), and a center for democracy (in Warsaw). Progress will be slow, as shown by the organization's inability to act early in the Yugoslav crisis. But because its 35 member states include countries from both Eastern and Western Europe as well as North America, the CSCE usefully complements the more traditional European security structure.

The United Nations (UN), too, might prove useful in Europe, as it already has in the case of Cyprus. The Security Council demonstrated new effectiveness in the Gulf War, and UN peacekeeping forces have much experience. They might be used for conflict management in Eastern Europe, but the UN has traditionally been cautious about involvement in civil war or in any conflict when contending parties do not agree on the UN's role. The Chinese and Soviet vetoes also remain a factor. So although the UN might be useful when the occasion



calls for it, it cannot be relied upon to provide continuing security for Europe.

Regional security proposals are springing up all over Europe to deal with local problems and to fill gaps left by the larger institutions. Nordic states, which already have the Nordic Council, muse about recreating the medieval Hanseatic League to provide a security framework for the Baltic republics (should they get independence). The three central European states already cooperate on security matters with meetings such as the one held recently in Visegrad. Romanians suggest that a Balkan League might bring peace to the area. Bulgarians see a future in a regional association with Greece. The Italians promote the Pentagonal group, which includes countries of the former Austro-Hungarian empire, and which Poland may soon join. The as-yet-unformed Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) would give the countries of southern Europe a forum for discussions with the Maghreb countries. Franco-German military cooperation continues despite low initial marks for the Franco-German Brigade. Each of these proposals responds to local needs and fills gaps in the existing structure.

### The Road Ahead

Europe in the 1990s might be seen as a set of concentric circles.<sup>22</sup> At the center are the nine nations that share membership in the EC and the WEU. As both institutions are strengthened, additional functions, such as implementing the Schengen agreement on borderless immigration, will be added. A second, wider circle would include the neutral EC members, a group likely to expand as European Free Trade Area (EFTA) countries join the

EC. A third concentric circle includes the "hopeful three" of central Europe (Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia), who are eager to join all of Western Europe's institutions. This group may be enlarged if the Baltic republics, Slovenia, Croatia, and others shed existing bonds and turn westward. A fourth group of states is likely to be on the outside, looking in. These would include the Soviet Union, the Balkan states, and probably Turkey. The United States and Canada are tied to this European model through NATO and an enhanced relationship with the EC.

Movement in the Europe of the 1990s will be generally toward the center circle. The inner core seeks to deepen its internal bonds. Many neutrals in the second group are reconsidering the value of neutrality in the new European order. Members of the third circle wait for their reforms to mature and for the Soviet Union to digest its current problems before they plunge to the center. The fourth group may be isolated from the rest of Europe, a situation that could cause long-term problems.

As these developments mature during this decade, some rules of the road might prove useful so that transatlantic ties remain strong and nations are not isolated as Europe deepens its integration process.

First, the United States should seek to make NATO a more attractive home for the European security identity. The London Declaration and recent NATO reorganization were steps in this direction. Eventually NATO will take on more characteristics of a bilateral European-North American alliance. The future model is a barbell with equal weights on both sides, rather than the current model of a wheel with the United States at the hub. The WEU should be actively en-



couraged to represent the European side, and NATO procedures may have to change to enhance the WEU's voice. The WEU's movement to Brussels and double-hatting WEU and NATO permanent representatives would be useful steps in this direction. Eventually the United States might consider strengthening Europe's role by alternating the SACEUR position with Europe, although the consensus for now is that SACEUR should remain an American. If alternating roles were agreed to, a U.S. deputy could retain nuclear authority for the United States when SACEUR is a European. Making NATO a more attractive home for a European defense identity also means making it more attractive for the French. At present, France appears unwilling to deepen its involvement in NATO and has generally created problems during the recent review. But after the changes that have taken place in Europe, there should be some convergence of French and NATO doctrine. In the nuclear area, for example, the dramatic decline in the number of theater warheads and the absence of viable targets in Eastern Europe mean that NATO's former doctrine of flexible response should move dramatically in the French direction. If agreement can be reached that use of nuclear weapons as a "last resort" means as a measure of desperation and not necessarily late in a war, then there might be opportunities for agreement on a key issue that has kept France and the rest of NATO apart. If Europe gains more control over NATO and doctrinal differences are reduced, France might eventually be lured further into NATO.

Second, Europe needs to be sensitive to U.S. fears of political and military isolation. The key is European patience. The defense integration pro-

cess should be furthered step by step, so that the United States can be convinced at each stage that the next step will not harm NATO. Thus, while Europe can state its long-term visions, deadlines should be avoided. The current plan to reconsider an EC-WEU merger in 1996, for example, should be kept vague so that it is not seen by the United States as a deadline. As each step unfolds, it is to be hoped that the United States will learn that the European voice in NATO is not confrontational but in fact provides the United States with a stronger, more united partner. At the outset, however, the IGC talks on political union should limit the EC's role to security issues that do not clash with NATO's principal defense mission. Assigning defense functions to the EC at this stage could signal that Europe is taking a separate path. Similarly, military planners should continue to integrate U.S. forces into multinational European forces at every opportunity to avoid isolation of the substantially reduced U.S. contingent.

Third, the U.S. campaign to warn Europe of the limits of European defense integration has thus far had a positive effect, but accelerating the campaign could be counterproductive because it would be seen as interfering in Europe's internal affairs. Having delivered its message, the last remaining superpower should now have the confidence to stand back and let Europe decide how it wants to make its internal decisions.

Fourth, development of a European force of 50,000 under the WEU's command could enhance Europe's defense identity and provide a capability for intervention without a superpower. Such a capability might prove useful in Eastern Europe or the Middle East. It would be relatively inexpensive if NATO's new Rapid Reaction Force



were reconfigured in time of crisis to drop the U.S. component. German and French participation would have to be worked out in advance. U.S. airlift, logistics, and intelligence capabilities would be needed at the outset to mobilize the force. Some degree of NATO consent would be required because troops would be pulled out of the NATO integrated command and the force's actions might eventually involve NATO in the conflict.

Fifth, the grey area of Western commitment to central Europe will suffice if no Soviet threat to the area reemerges. But should it reemerge, then vague commitments are more dangerous than no commitments at all. One need only remember the confusion about commitments to Poland in 1939, South Korea in 1950, and Kuwait in 1990 to conclude that Western intentions—one way or the other—should be made absolutely clear in the event of a real threat.

Sixth, the West needs to consider the tremendous costs of policy reversals or disintegration in the Soviet Union. A new world order backed up by UN enforcement is impossible without the Soviet Union. The Soviet nuclear threat remains. The Soviets are potentially powerful in Eastern Europe and parts of the Third World. Disintegration of the Union might give the West additional geostrategic advantages, but those advantages would be outweighed by the spillover risks of civil war and large-scale ethnic strife in a nuclear power. Although the West certainly cannot bring stability to the Soviet Union, it can help. The Grand Bargain may be overly ambitious, but a phased Western financial plan tied to specific economic milestones must be developed both to encourage further reforms and to ease the Soviet Union's transition to a free market. The imposition of political

conditions will be needed to make the plan feasible in the United States.

Steps also need to be taken to assure the increasingly nervous Soviet military that the West will not threaten Soviet forces and that Soviet military institutions will benefit from improved relations. NATO should conduct relations with the Soviet Union in a manner that will promote Soviet integration in Europe, not its continuing segregation from it. And the CSCE military doctrine dialogue might be intensified to further expose Soviet officers to Western security policy.

Finally, NATO should reconsider its prohibition of out-of-area operations. It would be dangerous to set up a mechanism that *requires* NATO to make decisions on third world disputes because agreement would be difficult in most cases. But if agreement can be reached, there is no legal obstacle to NATO's use of force beyond its treaty region. As the traditional threat from the Soviet Union fades, it is precisely the instabilities to the South that will increase in importance. By automatically taking itself out of the picture, NATO diminishes its overall usefulness. A place to start might be with instabilities on NATO's immediate periphery.

## Conclusions

In the coming years, the perilous certainty of the Cold War will give way to the uncertain instability of a new European order. European security institutions are adjusting fairly well to the new environment and will form a flexible set of capabilities to meet the new challenges. The experience of 1914, when such instabilities were mismanaged by rigid alliance systems, is unlikely to be repeated.

New problems now exist for the transatlantic partnership: how to man-



age the Soviet decline; how to provide security for Eastern Europe; how to respond to future out-of-area problems; and how to handle the emerging European defense identity. So far, answers to the first three appear to lie to a large degree beyond the purview of NATO. The new and revived institutions like the WEU and the CSCE may have to take up the challenge, or NATO will have to expand its mandate. Yet NATO, even with its existing mandate, remains crucial to Europe's peace. Efforts spurred by the Gulf War to develop a new European defense identity must proceed carefully, using cautious rules of the road. If the United States supports Europe's long-term vision of its future, and Europe in turn respects the U.S. fear of isolation, adjustments can be made to retain a healthy transatlantic relationship.

## Notes

1. For further discussion, see Hans Binnendijk, "What Kind of a New Order for Europe?" *The World Today* 47 (February 1991), pp. 19-21.
2. Michael Z. Wise, "Soviets Accept Limits on Arms in Europe," *Washington Post*, June 15, 1991, p. A-16.
3. Briefing in Moscow with members of the Soviet General Staff, November 1990.
4. Such a minimal deterrence program might include cuts to about 4,000 relatively invulnerable strategic nuclear warheads per side (i.e., real reductions by more than 50 percent after START I) and about 500 air-delivered weapons each in Europe for the United States and the USSR.
5. Thomas L. Friedman, "NATO Tries to Ease Military Concerns in Eastern Europe," *New York Times*, June 7, 1991, p. A-1.
6. François Heisbourg, "The Future Political and Security Architecture of Europe" (Paper presented to the Rome Conference on the Future of European Security, Rome, May 3, 1991).
7. See John Orme, "Security in East Central Europe: Seven Futures," and Jan Zielonka, "East Central Europe: Democracy in Retreat?" *The Washington Quarterly* 14 (Summer 1991), pp. 91-105 and 107-120, respectively.
8. Klaus Wittmann, "Work on NATO's Future Military Strategy" (unclassified briefing for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, April 16, 1991).
9. For the text of the London Declaration, see *Survival* 32 (September/October 1990), pp. 469-472.
10. Author's interviews at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, April 1991.
11. Paul L. Montgomery, "NATO Is Planning to Cut U.S. Forces in Europe by 50%," *New York Times*, May 29, 1991, p. A-1.
12. Alan Riding, "NATO: Still the Armorer for Europe," *New York Times*, May 30, 1991, p. A-3.
13. Jacques Delors, "European Integration and Security," Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture (International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, March 7, 1991).
14. Franco-German Non-Paper (working paper), January 1991.
15. Also see "WEU's Role and Place in the New European Security Architecture" (Presidency's conclusions to the extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers, Paris, February 22, 1991).
16. William Taft, "The US Role in the New Europe" (Address to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, February 9, 1991).
17. Friedman, "NATO Tries to Ease Military Concerns," p. A-8.
18. Author's interviews at SHAPE, Mons, Belgium, April 1991.
19. Helmut Kohl, "The Agenda of German Politics for the Nineties" (Speech at a luncheon sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, the Atlantic Council, and the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, Washington, D.C., May 20, 1991).



European Security Order

20. Based primarily on author's interviews at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, April 1991. Wörner's principles, set out in a speech to the Atlantic Council in Washington, D.C., on June 25, 1991, were: (1) NATO is the essential forum for consultation and decision making on defense matters; (2) The new system must maintain the strategic unity of all its members; (3) It must strengthen the transatlantic link; (4) It must maintain transparency in the decision-making process; (5) Complementarity must be preserved; (6) NATO nations must not be marginalized; (7) The integrated military structure must be retained.
21. This convergence was in evidence during the NATO defense ministers' meeting on May 28, 1991. The ministers stated that "the efforts to develop a European Security identity and defense role should lead to a strengthened European pillar within the alliance." Riding, "NATO," p. A-3.
22. A related model has been proposed by Edward Mortimer of the *Financial Times*.