

Smarter Defense: Mission Focus Groups


Wilton Park

September 13, 2011

Hans Binnendijk


Study Overview

Part 2: Identify “Must Have” Capabilities




Part 3: Identify Gaps in “Must Have” Capabilities

- 1) Identify *Known Gaps* in “Must Have” Capabilities
- 2) Determine *Emergent Gaps* resulting from recent cuts



Part 4: Propose *Smart Defense* initiatives to address gaps in “Must Have” Capabilities

- 1) Protect *On-Hand* “Must Have” Capabilities
- 2) Mitigate *Emergent Gaps*
- 3) Forestall *Future Gaps*
- 4) Focus collective efforts on closing *Known/Existing Gaps*





“Must Have” Capability Focus*

Tier 1	Tier 2	Tier 3 (Additional Description)
Project	Deployment/ Redeployment	Personnel; Materiel (Rapid); Materiel (Bulk)
	Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOM & I)	Reception of Cargo, Personnel and Equipment; Staging
	Basing	Deployed Basing
Engage	Joint Maneuver/Joint Fires	Air; Land; Maritime; Special Operations; Information
	Ballistic Missile Defense	Theater (Deployed Forces); European Territory
Sustain (to include those capabilities critical to NATO’s Comprehensive Approach)	Military Engineering Support	Freedom of Movement; Construction, Infrastructure, Life Support
	Supply Services	Life Support Services
	Theater Movement and Transportation	In-Theater Movement and Resupply
Inform	Medical	Treatment Support; Evacuation
	Collection	All Environments
	Processing	Analysis
Consult, Command, Control (C3)	Command & Control	Operational; Tactical
Protect	Defence	Cyber Threats

* Derived from NATO’s “Capability Hierarchy Framework”

Preliminary Conclusions on Must Have Gaps

- Gaps identified by Bi-SC Assessment and US Mission Force Goal analysis are the most critical near term Must Haves. These have widened due to financial crisis.
- Further substantial defense cuts probable 2012 - 2015.
- Some national cost-cutting strategies positive: base closures, overhead cuts, command consolidations, cut old systems
- Other cost-cutting strategies are diluting force quality and hollowing out readiness for all but deploying/deployed forces. This puts future LoA missions at risk through lack of readiness.
- Absence of reconstitution plans a hidden, worrisome gap.
- There should be a mechanism for nations to inform and consult on pending national decisions that impact Alliance capabilities.



Future NATO Must Have Capability Gaps being Generated by Financial Crisis

- Readiness for future ops: curtailment of training, education, exercises, equipment maintenance and upgrades (other than deploying forces)
- Procurement: Postponement, reductions or cancellation of programs (e.g., A400M, NH-90, EF-2000, F-35, interceptors/national C2 for missile defenses) essential to future operations.
- Deactivation: infantry brigades, other units needed for sustained operations; unknown lessening of NATO capacity for high end operations.
- Deployability: Shortages of RSOM, Airbase Activation Modules, Air-to-Air refueling, all types of strategic lift assets
- Sustainment: land forces CS/CSS shortfalls growing – type units needed for all ops (PKO, HA/DR, S&R, combat)
- Stockage: deferment of re-stocking of expended PGM's & other munitions, fuel, repair parts, lost equipment
- Recovery: General absence of reconstitution, remobilization plans should strategic outlook change



Mission Focus Group Concept

- Develop a new concept to focus smart defense on core missions and emerging capabilities gaps in the post ISAF NATO as members grapple with substantial austerity measures.
- Concept would insure that allies can deliver capabilities to execute three Strategic Concept tasks (collective defense, crisis management, cooperative security).
- Break these three tasks into an illustrative 6-9 Mission Focus Groups designed to provide in aggregate, and at appropriate levels of readiness, the core capabilities to execute NATO's three strategic tasks.
- Nations would be urged to associate with one, several, or all MFGs as part of their national efforts to husband defense resources. The process would be voluntary, but MFG's would be provided clear guidance and direction from the Secretary General and SACEUR so as to ensure members' resources are leveraged to optimum effect.
- The MFG process is an initiative for setting a nation's individual defense priorities, avoiding Alliance wide redundancies, and conserving resources while meeting requirements.
- It does not diminish each member's responsibility for Article 5 missions or the solidarity of the Alliance as a whole.
- The concept emphasizes Article 3 of the Washington Treaty, and is consistent with current NATO Defense Planning Process (NDPP) and directives. Each MFG would be expected to work through relevant existing NATO structures as much as practicable, in particular, the NATO Command Structure, the NRDC's, and the rest of the NATO Force Structure.


Mission Focus Group Concept (cont).

- Elements of this concept are already in existence. The MFG concept is designed to provide a more conceptual and comprehensive approach.
- MFGs would be the core “force providers” for their respective mission(s), taking responsibility to “organize, train and equip” their forces at both national and NATO levels, consistent with directives from the Strategic Commanders. The NATO requirements process would be adjusted to make MFGs a centerpiece of the process.
- Each MFG should designate a lead nation (or co-lead nations) to link to NATO commands/agencies and guide the multinational process. Lead nations should communicate regularly to maintain unity across the MFGs, especially among MFG’s associated with particular NATO strategic tasks.
- EUCOM would engage fully, at the command level and through all relevant subordinate forces and units as the U.S. link to each MFG.
- Justifying EUCOM deployments based on the MFG concept could provide a stronger basis for maintaining a viable US force presence in Europe.
- ACT would oversee the MFG process in support of ACO.
- Pooling and sharing arrangements, acquisition approaches, industrial cooperation, force generation, and possibly multinational forces should be designed/revised as needed to support the MFG approach.

Mission Focus Group Concept (cont).


- All these efforts, combined with the MFG initiative will preserve and deepen the high level of interoperability achieved by NATO almost 20 years in the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere – and become stronger collectively even as operations are concluded, commands are retired, and NATO/nations implement essential austerity measures.
- MFGs success will be to guard against the emergence of gaps in core “must have” capabilities that would create unacceptable risk in the accomplishment of NATO strategic tasks.
- MFG’s provide a vehicle for nations to advance already extant or new multinational cooperation, and do so more readily and expeditiously than on an Alliance-wide scale. They also provide visibility on overages and redundancies, areas where allies can look for economies in defense spending.
- Partner nations would be invited to participate in the MFGs.
- The concept could be a bridge between the Lisbon and Chicago summits. It can also map the way forward for an effective, capable Alliance through the near to mid term (2-10 years) as nations both respond to economic conditions and reset their militaries for a post-ISAF environment.

Strategic Concept Tasks




Developed from UK MOD Concept

Mission Focus Groups (MFGs)



* Goal would be full spectrum capabilities comparable in quality to U.S.

Strategic Concept Tasks and Mission Focus Groups



Task A. Collective Defense

MFG1: Boarder Defense

MFG2: Maritime Defense

MFG3: Nuclear Deterrence/Missile Defense

MFG4: Emerging Threats (cyber, energy)

Task B. Crisis Management

MFG5: Power Projection

MFG6: Comprehensive Approach (S&R)

MFG7: Counter Terror/COIN

Task C. Cooperative Security

MFG8: Building Partner Capacity

MFG9: Comprehensive Approach (S&R)

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Back up Slides

SOI: Enduring, Current Mission Sets (CJSORs)

- Current, enduring missions:
 - MJO: ISAF
 - SJO (Air): Libya
 - SJO (Maritime): Counter-Piracy
 - SJO (Maritime): Operation Active Endeavor
 - SJO (Land): KFOR
 - SJO (Joint): NRF
- Other operational activities:
 - Baltic Air Policing
 - Support to African Union (airlift)
 - NTM-I (land, training)
 - EU Battlegroups (joint)
- Most demanding:
 - Article 5 (MJO concurrent w/ISAF)
 - Consequence Management (w/in Europe)
 - Short-notice HA/DR at strategic distance
 - “Freedom of the Seas/Global Commons”



Will Additional Significant Defense Cuts be Taken?

- France – Expect major reductions to be announced after April 2012 election. Second carrier will not be realized.
- Germany – Not anticipated - significant cuts already announced through 2015
- Italy – Very likely next year. Will keep commitments to NATO, F-35
- Netherlands – Significant cuts approved to 2015; no further cuts anticipated
- Poland – Not anticipated, yet unknown factor is fall 2011 elections
- Spain – Deep cuts possible but none to NATO commitments
- UK – Further cuts are very likely. May have to choose between F-35 and Trident investments.



SOI: Priority Shortfall Areas (PSA)

- Deployable C2
- Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
- Multinational Medical Support
- C-IED
- JFACC/ETAC
- Strategic Lift
 - Sea
 - Air
- Aero-Medevac
- Air Combat Support
 - AWACS
 - AAR
- Tactical PSYOPS
- WMD/CBRNE Protection/Engagement
- Naval Mine Countermeasures
- Expeditionary Basing
 - Dep Airbase Act Mods (DAAM)
 - Force Support Engineering
- In-Theater Airlift
 - Helos
 - Support
- Multinational RSOM
 - Staging Area Support
 - Convoy Support
- Electronic Warfare
 - Support/Escort Jamming
 - Stand-off Jamming

Future Gaps Indicated by NATO Operation Unified Protector (Libya)

For Future European-led, US supported Operations:

- NATO operations beyond ISAF can and will materialize with little warning
- US C3 and ISTAR capabilities essential for any NATO operation
- Capabilities shortfalls are as much a matter of political will as actual capabilities
- Actual enabling capabilities are essential and too narrowly the province of one or two allies
- Europe's air and maritime powers under much operational and financial stress by relatively small, close, brief operation - with no land component.

A Notional Short Term Approach

- Create one or two MFGs, for example one MFG for Article 5 missions and another for Middle East missions that involve stabilization, reconstruction, and comprehensive approaches.
- Fence off—from steep budget cuts—deployable forces that are needed for MJO's and SJO's.
- Multinational armaments cooperation – build on CNAD Lessons Learned and Best Practices.
- Use pooling and sharing to pursue three or four critical enablers: e.g., MPA, helicopters, medical support, counter-IED systems, and NEC systems – *and deliver one in short term.*
- Expand the British-French expeditionary force to include niche-area air and naval contributions from other countries.
- Establish initial multinational logistic partnerships among several willing members while pooling and sharing WRM/WRS stocks.
- Initiate the process of establishing smart defense programs in NATO's professional military schools.