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OUT OF AREA CONTINGENCIES

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### Introduction

- . It took Magellan's crew almost 3 years to circumnavigate the globe. Phineas Fogg did it in 80 days. It took John Glen about 90 minutes. I have been asked to do it in 20 minutes.
- . My task is to talk about regional conflict and out of area contingencies that could affect NATO and Europe. The first question to ask is, what is left "in the area".

### Impact of the End of the Cold War

- . The end of the Cold War -- if it is truly over -- has meant a willingness on the part of the two "superpowers" to cooperate on the settlement of regional disputes. Each summit or ministerial meeting has had an element of consultation on regional issues.
- . And US-Soviet cooperation has meant that the UN has been released from its cold war deep freeze. If the US and USSR agree on the solution to a regional conflict, they have a reasonably good chance of passing a UN Security Council resolution and initiating peace keeping operations. Five peacekeeping operations were started up in 1989-90 and at least two more are under consideration.
- . The end of the Cold War has had its most dramatic impact on what might be called the Reagan Doctrine conflicts. These were the conflicts with high East-West ideological content that threatened to affect the US and Soviet Union directly. Progress has been greatest in two areas: Central America and Southern Africa.
- . In Central America, Nicaragua has undergone an East Europe-like transformation, with all the democratic benefits and economic transition pain. The difference is that the Sandanistas remain in control of the Army and Violetta Chamorro's hold on power is fragile. In El Salvador, UN sponsored peace talks broke down in the fall and were followed by an FMLN offensive. Nonetheless, progress has been made in both countries during the past two years.
- . In Southern Africa, the end of the Cold War helped bring independence to Namibia and has put a US-Soviet sponsored peace effort into effect in Angola. Both superpowers told their clients in Angola not to expect military aid in the future and to support a staged effort leading to a cease fire.
- . In other areas, fighting continues despite US and Soviet withdrawal.
- . In Cambodia, the picture is mixed. The UN has managed to sponsor a peace plan, Vietnamese forces are out of Cambodia and China says it has halted aid to the Khmer Rouge. Despite this cooperation, however, the Hun Sen government has rejected the UN plan as "suicidal" and the fighting is likely to escalate.

- . In Afghanistan, fighting continues but President Najibullah has indicated his willingness to step down in favour of an all party commission, with a possible role for King Zahir Shah. Peace is not yet at hand.
- . In the Horn of Africa, Siad Barre (who played on both sides in the Cold War) has fallen in Somalia. The UN has opened up the port of Massawa in Ethiopia and a food aid pipeline has been established. Optimists believe this is a first step in a peace process.
- . The point here is that these Reagan Doctrine conflicts, which helped define the Cold War from 1975 to 1986 are no longer issues for superpower confrontation. In many cases, peace efforts are underway. In most cases some fighting continues, but even if it should flare up, it is likely to be contained to the region.
- . But the end of the Cold War has had a second effect on regional conflict. As the superpowers seemed to be withdrawing from regional peacekeeping, there was a temptation for strong regional powers to take advantage of the situation and seek regional hegemony. Some have miscalculated.
- . In the case of Saddam Hussein, he was no longer restrained (if he ever was) by the Soviets, while he believed (a belief reinforced by the US Ambassador) that the US was disengaged and would not intervene.
- . The coalition response was also made possible by the end of the Cold War. Without Soviet support, the UN would not have provided authority to use all necessary means; and without that Congress would never have granted Bush authority to take the offensive.
- . It is important to note that not all regional powers have reacted this way. President Assad of Syria took the other path when the Soviets decided to reduce Soviet support for his country. He decided to develop closer relations with the West.
- . So the end of the Cold War has brought both peace and war to various regions of the world.

#### Impact of the Gulf War

- . In the United States there has been a significant shift in focus during the past few years towards out of area contingencies. A few indications:
  - President Bush's August 'Base Force Strategy' speech placed major emphasis on a new Contingency Force for Third World Operators.
  - Intelligence agencies have dramatically shifted assets from the Warsaw Pact to the Third World.
  - The focus of the SDI program has shifted to ground based systems and the ballistic missile proliferation threat is

putting new energy into the programme. ATBMs will also become popular in Europe.

- And an example you will appreciate, at the Naval War College, teachers are shifting their courses from topics such as the Soviet Navy to the Indian navy.

. But the extent to which the US can participate in out of area operations in the future depends directly on the outcome of the Gulf War. Military outcome may be certain, but the political outcome is an open question.

. On the one hand, President Bush, in his State of the Union speech, looked forward to the American century and talked about future burdens of leadership. He sees the establishment of a New World Order in which aggression has no place. It may be up to the US, as the "last superpower", to be the policeman of that New World Order. But to establish this vision, Bush must win in the Gulf, and the cost must be low. If being a policeman means running a sanitary microchip war, then the US people are willing to go along. As long as casualties are low.

. But there is a second outcome. Public support for Bush is high, (80% plus) but fragile. Forty seven Senators voted against the war and Democrats who control both houses of Congress are generally inclined against a world policeman role. If there is a costly ground campaign on live television, the reversals could be dramatic. Isolationism could easily set in.

. The most likely outcome in my view is that there will be significant casualties, but Bush will be able to declare victory. That outcome, plus budget pressures, will probably lead to a result in which the US chooses its interests carefully but is prepared to defend them.

. The Gulf crisis shows that Europe is not yet able to coordinate out of area policy. Even Jacques Delors and Nicholas Ridley agree on the diagnosis. NATO is potentially threatened by a difficult period in US-German relations. The IGC effort will be more difficult than before and some say efforts at EC security and foreign policy integration have been set back years. Only the WEU has come out ahead.

. But I think the longer term effect will be to polarize the IGC effort. Delors and Ridley do not agree on the cure. Many Europeans do not like the way in which the US has called the shots throughout the crisis; they want a larger say. They will seek a common voice on a peace plan as a first step. Britain will firmly resist efforts to institutionalize majority voting - fearing a least common denominator solution. The first shots of this battle were fired at the Franco-German proposal by Hans Van den Broek and Douglas Hurd.

. Europe has many advantages that the US does not in out of area issues. France has special ties in the Maghreb and the Levant. Britain has historic ties to the Gulf. In the past these ties have

lead to differing national interests and divided policies. If coordination can succeed, Europe will have a strengthened hand.

The impact of the Gulf War may thus be to force Europe to make some tough choices on security integration in light of the first failure.

In the Third World, the Gulf War could have several effects. It will boost respect for Western technology and it should make leaders think twice before committing aggression. But it may also show some potential troublemakers how to manipulate divisions. It certainly will result in new demands for high technology weapons.

#### Post-War Western Responsibilities in the Gulf.

If Saddam Hussein and his armies remain a threat to Iraq's neighbours, the demands for a long term US/UK commitment will be great.

The Gulf could remain highly unstable after the war, with a power vacuum in Iraq, growing Iranian influence, revival of Islamic fundamentalism and Arab bitterness if the US does not press Israel on the Palestinian issue.

Baker and Hurd both envision a large role for regional security forces - a new Baghdad Pact. There is a role for regional forces, but not as the ultimate guarantors of Gulf security. They would prove useful as part of a multilateral peacekeeping force in Kuwait and possibly along the Saudi-Iraqi order. But the Gulf War shows the limits of their effectiveness.

The US, UK and probably France will have to provide security commitments to the Gulf Cooperation Council states if they are to have real security. That commitment would apply to potential threats from Iran as well as Iraq. Forces would be needed to back up this commitment. Air and naval forces would need to remain in the area on a fairly permanent basis, and army forces would leave prepositioned equipment. The continuing costs of this ongoing operation will be high. A new UN resolution might be needed to cover these deployments.

So there will be demands for firm commitments and force deployments in what might be an increasingly unstable region.

#### Adjacent Contingencies

We have for too long been operating without a general definition of "out of area". It has sometimes meant all potential conflicts not in the NATO area, and it has sometimes meant only the Persian Gulf.'

I suggest that "out of area" contingencies should be divided into two categories: 1) adjacent contingencies and 2) distant contingencies.

Contingencies "adjacent to the area" would include those that 1) could result in an attack on a NATO member (Iraq-Turkey), 2) could spill over and directly affect the security of NATO states (E Europe) and 3) those within SCUD range of NATO (Libya).

- . Countries in this arc run from Poland to Morocco. The potential for conflict here is considerable.
- . Eastern Europe must now be considered in this category. We are all familiar with the basic problems:
  - fragile economics in transition.
  - problems of ethnic minorities
  - potential border disputes
  - potential disintegration of states
  - strategic limbo
  - concern over disruption and potential reversal in the Soviet Union.
- . Many of these problems require economic support and possibly European peacekeeping efforts.
- . Slowly these countries will develop security relationships with NATO - first through organizations like the North Atlantic Assembly. But within a few years, an implicit NATO commitment may extend to Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia. NATO needs to develop explicit policies towards these countries and not unknowingly slip into commitments.
- . Moving clockwise, we have in this "adjacent" category, the Gulf, and then the Arab-Israeli conflict. Everyone includes the Arab-Israeli problem in their postwar peace plans, but the US and Europe have very different approaches in mind. Arab expectations will be high and disappointment could be great. Coalitions could build against Israel. US - European coordination should be maximised now.
- . Finally, we have the states of the Maghreb, where there is also a potential for conflict and major policy differences. But the threat to Europe is not primarily military. It is immigration, terrorism, and possibly the effects of Islamic fundamentalism. The victory of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front in last Spring's municipal elections sent a shiver down several French spines. Libya's Colonel Qaddafi will continue to try to dominate Chad and influence others in the region.
- . The contingencies in this arc are of increasing vital interest to many European countries. Policies differ, in some cases dramatically. Given the increased prominence of these issues, however, and their importance to individual member states, NATO and the EC need to work out now as many common positions as possible. Otherwise, when and if disputes flare up and require action, we will see a repeat of the divisions created by the Gulf War.

Distant Contingencies.

- . There is a second, broader arc of contingencies which runs from Korea, through Taiwan and Hong Kong, Cambodia, the Indian sub continent, the Horn of Africa, and Southern Africa, to Central America.

These are problems of special interest to the US and in some cases to individual European countries, but they are in general not of vital interest to Europe or NATO. But at least two contingencies (Korea and Central America) could lead to combat for US forces, and one (India-Pakistan) could lead to nuclear exchange.

In South Korea, troops are on a state of maximum high alert over concerns that the North will strike while the US is involved in the Gulf. North-South diplomatic meetings at the Foreign Minister level have made little progress. Each side is wooing allies of its enemy and North Korea is becoming diplomatically isolated. Kim Il Sung remains capable of erratic action in his old age and the secession is uncertain. He has an active duty force larger than Iraq's (1,111,000) but his tank force (3,500) and air force (716 combat aircraft) are not as modern as Iraq's. He also has FROG and some SCUD-B and is seeking a nuclear option. South Korean forces (750,000) are less numerous but increasingly more modern (48 F-16, 204 F-5s). But US forces (44,000 before cuts) are in place with nuclear capable Lance. Unless the North tragically miscalculates, peace will probably continue.

China seems to be handling the Hong Kong and Taiwan issues satisfactorily through diplomacy. So far so good, but the stakes are high for the UK and the US if things go wrong.

In Cambodia, UN peacekeeping efforts, if peacemaking succeeds, could involve large numbers of US, Soviet and European peacekeeping forces.

In one case - the Indian sub continent, incidents in Kashmir could easily lead to nuclear conflict between Indian and Pakistan. India reportedly has enough plutonium for 70 - 90 atomic bombs while Pakistan has enough enriched uranium for 10-15 weapons. India has 50 Mig 29 and 49 Mirage 2000 to deliver them, while Pakistan has 39 F-16. India has an Agni missile successfully tested in 1989, which has a range of 2,500 km. Pakistan has tested the Hatf-2 missile with ranges of 500 km. But at least in the most recent crisis, a form of nuclear deterrence seems to have restrained both sides.

Conflicts in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka will continue without major power intervention.

The contingencies in Africa - the Horn and South Africa - are for the West humanitarian and human rights issues, where the tools of diplomacy are food aid or sanctions. South Africa will remain a domestic political issue in the US, but use of US forces is highly unlikely.

In Central America, a shift in fortunes in either Nicaragua or El Salvador could involve large numbers of US advisers. The US, under Bush, is unlikely to see a Sandanista-led coup in Nicaragua or an FMLN victory in El Salvador without some direct US intervention.

Another possible problem area is Cuba. If Castro comes under pressure as Soviet aid is withdrawn, the US may seek ways - short of direct intervention - to speed his departure.

- . There are thus two areas in this arc (Korea, Central America) where there is a risk that US troops might be engaged, but in these two cases, the US would likely participate without major NATO support.
- . Diplomatic and humanitarian efforts are needed in the other cases (especially India-Pakistan) but direct military involvement by a NATO country seems unlikely (outside of the UN peacekeeping role).

Conclusions:

1. The end of the Cold War has brought US-Soviet led peacekeeping efforts to many parts of the world, with mixed results. The prospects for US-Soviet confrontation over regional issues is minimal, even if the Soviet military is in ascendency.
2. The Gulf War may be sui generis in boldness of the aggression, the size of regional armies involved, and the effectiveness with which the US was able to construct a UN coalition. The closest comparison might be a potential North Korean invasion of the South.
3. The US role in future regional conflicts is heavily dependent upon the outcome of the Gulf War.
4. The most worrisome contingency for the US and Europe today is the spread of the Gulf war to Jordan, Iran, or Turkey. Another is the fall of moderate Arab leaders as a result of the rise of Islamic Fundamentalism. Establishing clear post war goals should help with both problems.
5. Western Europe is surrounded by a continuous belt of instability from the Baltic States, through Central and South Eastern Europe, the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and the Maghreb. The nature of the threat varies from unchecked immigration to SCUD missiles. Most of the problems will require economic assistance and possibly (in the case of Eastern Europe) peacekeeping forces. Except in the Gulf War and possibly in North Africa, national force deployments to these areas are unlikely to be necessary. There remains, however, the prospect of another Arab-Israeli war.
6. European security policy coordination, if it can be achieved, could help deal with the problem of Eastern Europe and the Maghreb. It could be dangerous in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict if it clashes with US policy. If an institutional mechanism is set up with the EC, to coordinate security policy, it must avoid two pitfalls: 1) paralysis of policy through a lowest common denominator approach, which may be inherent in majority voting; and 2) alienation of the United States.
7. In the distant area, the dangers of US engagement in conflict in Korea and Central America remain, but the risk is not great. One area that needs more urgent diplomatic attention is the India-Pakistan conflict.
8. The WEU has proven itself to be a worthy organization both as an organizer of Europe's naval operation in the Gulf, and as a crossroads between NATO and the EC. It should be given a European



Mobile Force to deal with possible out of area problems. It should not be absorbed by the EC because that could remove its linkage to NATO.

9. NATO has avoided out of area issues, but that may no longer be possible. Too many issues in the adjacent area impinge upon NATO interests. And if the EC begins to take unified positions on out of area security issues, NATO may be one place to coordinate those EC positions with the US.